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Note 
AGENCY DISCRETION AND STATUTORY MANDATES IN 
A TIME OF INADEQUATE FUNDING:  AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO IN RE AIKEN COUNTY 
BRET KUPFER 
When an agency fails to abide by a statutory mandate, aggrieved 
parties may petition the courts for an order compelling the agency to act.  
In the interest of Congress’s constitutional power, courts will grant the 
petition and force agencies to comply.  However, it is unclear whether an 
agency violates a statutory mandate when Congress intentionally 
withholds adequate funds to comply with the mandate. 
On August 13, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit ordered the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
to spend $11.1 million in carryover appropriations to review an 
application for a nuclear waste repository in Yucca Mountain.  Congress 
has not provided additional funding in the last three years, and the $11.1 
million is grossly inadequate to complete the statutory mandate.  The order 
will produce no measurable benefit to the petitioners or the public, and the 
waste of funding is an absurd result that Congress never intended.  A 
review of decisions across other circuits shows a split on whether a writ of 
mandamus is always appropriate when an agency fails to meet a statutory 
mandate.  Conjoining the factors considered in those opinions, this Note 
lays out an alternative to forcing agencies to act when there is near 
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AGENCY DISCRETION AND STATUTORY MANDATES IN 
A TIME OF INADEQUATE FUNDING:  AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO IN RE AIKEN COUNTY 
BRET KUPFER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress’s failure to pass appropriation bills in a timely manner 
undermines the effectiveness and efficiency of government.  It has been 
more than a decade since Congress passed all twelve of the regular 
appropriation bills before the start of the fiscal year (FY).1  With increasing 
frequency, the House and Senate pass lump-sum omnibus bills that limit 
debate and the opportunity for members to make amendments.2  Funding 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; SUNY New Paltz, magna cum 
laude, B.A. 2005.  I would like to thank Professor Richard Parker for his thoughtful feedback during 
the drafting of this Note.  In addition, I owe many thanks to the members of the Connecticut Law 
Review for their hard work and collegial support.  As a matter of disclosure, I worked at the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission for one summer.  My responsibilities were not related to any of the matters 
mentioned in this Note.  Aside from the sources cited, all legal analysis, arguments, and suggestions of 
policy are mine alone. 
1 The fiscal year begins October 1 before the corresponding calendar year and ends September 30.  
2 U.S.C. § 631 (2012).  When an impasse occurs, threatening a shutdown of the government, Congress 
passes a “continuing resolution” which extends a proportional amount of funds for each agency’s 
appropriation respective to the amount appropriated in the previous year for the time period determined 
in the continuing resolution.  For example, if an agency was appropriated $12 billion for FY 1, and 
Congress passed a two-month continuing resolution from October 1 to December 1 for FY 2, then the 
agency is instructed to operate on a $2 billion budget for two months without knowing how much will 
be provided in the last ten months of the fiscal year.  To prevent government shutdowns, Congress has 
passed at least one continuing resolution each year for the past decade.  E.g., Continuing 
Appropriations Resolution, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-175, 126 Stat. 1313 (2012); Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-33, 125 Stat. 363 (2011); Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2011, Pub. L. No. 111-242, 124 Stat. 2607 (2010); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-68, div. B, 123 Stat. 2023, 2043–53 (2009); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 110-329, div. A, 122 Stat. 3574, 3574–84 (2008); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-92, 121 Stat. 989 (2007); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 109-289, 120 Stat. 1257, 1311–16 (2006); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-77, 119 Stat. 2037 (2005); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-309, 
118 Stat. 1137 (2004); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-84, 117 Stat. 
1042 (2003).  The government shutdown that ensued as this Note went to publication further 
emphasizes the inability to pass appropriation bills before the start of the fiscal year.  
2 For example, for FY 2013 the full Senate failed to consider separately several bills reported 
from committee.  S. 3301, 112th Cong. (as passed by S. Comm. on Appropriations, June 14, 2012); 
S. 3216, 112th Cong. (as passed by S. Comm. on Appropriations, May 22, 2012); S. 2465, 112th Cong. 
(as passed S. Comm. on Appropriations, Apr. 26, 2012); S. 2375, 112th Cong. (as passed by S. Comm. 
on Appropriations, Apr. 26, 2012); S. 2323, 112th Cong. (as passed by S. Comm. on Appropriations, 
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levels for authorized programs are not receiving the consideration they 
deserve, and federal agencies are increasingly tasked with implementing 
our federal laws without knowing what resources they may rely upon to 
perform a sufficient job.  Nonetheless, Congress will continue to pass 
authorizations that span multiple years while failing to provide funding in 
each subsequent year.  Agencies are without guidance as to whether they 
can cut or ignore underfunded statutory mandates. 
Congress’s failure to consider funding levels of specific programs not 
only creates problems for an agency that does not know how to proceed, 
but also for the courts that provide judicial review of the agency’s action.  
Federal rulemaking, adjudications, and informal decision making is 
plagued with delays that are created in part by Congress’s failure to 
provide funding.  These delays impact individuals in countless ways.  
Veterans are not receiving their benefits on time, innovators are deterred 
from investing in patents, and drug manufacturers are stalled when trying 
to bring potentially life-saving medication to market.3 
We have a problem posed by agencies that delay congressional 
mandates for years or miss deadlines, but the courts have not crafted a 
clear doctrine on how delays should be remedied.  The Supreme Court has 
never addressed the issue, the circuit courts have been split for ten years, 
and the lower courts are in need of guidance.  The Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA)4 states that a court “shall compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”5 and some courts and 
scholars interpret this to mean that a court must issue a writ of mandamus 
when an agency misses a statutory deadline.  Of the scholarly pieces 
offering suggestions on the matter, only a few comment on whether an 
agency with inadequate funding must always abide by a statutory deadline. 
This Note examines how an agency’s obligation to perform an 
underfunded mandate and its discretion to allocate its own resources were 
weighed against each other in an August 13, 2013, decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—In re Aiken 
County.6  Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to force the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to review the Department of Energy’s 
                                                                                                                          
Apr. 19, 2012).  For FY 2011, a majority of appropriation bills were not enacted as Congress passed 
continuing resolutions extending to FY 2012.  Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, div. B, 125 Stat. 38, 102 (2011). 
3 See, e.g., James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The Problem of 
Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing by Federal Agencies, 64 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 57, 66, 70 (2012) (noting that the average processing of an appeal to the Social Security 
Administration increased from 274 days in 2000 to 481 days by 2006, the length of time to process a 
patent was 35 months in 2010, and the average time for a veteran to dispute a decision by the Board of 
Veterans’ Appeals was 3.9 years).  
4 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
5 Id. § 706(1). 
6 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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(DOE’s) application for a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in 
Nevada.7  Although the NRC failed to act within the statutory deadline 
established by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA),8 the agency argued 
that its delay was lawful because the remaining $11.1 million appropriated 
to review the application for Yucca is inadequate to finish the review and 
Congress will not provide additional funds in the foreseeable future.9  
Petitioners argued that the NRC is statutorily required to use all available 
funds until the mandate is achieved.10  The court ordered the agency to 
spend the $11.1 million, despite the likelihood that doing so would not 
provide any relief for the petitioner.11  This Note takes the position that 
even when an agency misses a congressionally imposed deadline, the 
agency action is not unreasonably delayed when it is near certain a court 
order requiring the agency to act will not expedite relief for the claimant 
due to a lack of future appropriations. 
Part II of this Note provides the factual story of nuclear waste in 
America, and provides context for the financial, political, and legal issues 
that led the NRC to toll its review of the application for a repository in 
Yucca Mountain.  Part III introduces the reader to judicial review of 
agency decisions, and considers cases where deadlines, inadequate 
appropriations, and absurd effects of a statute factored into the court’s 
decision on whether the agency had discretion to not implement a law.  In 
Part IV, I propose a new rule and a set of factors to guide courts in 
deciding whether to order an agency to act upon a statutory mandate when 
the agency does not have the adequate funds to comply. 
II.  BACKGROUND ON YUCCA AND THE LITIGATION 
A.  History of Nuclear Waste 
The NRC’s duty to review the DOE’s application for a permanent 
nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain is the most recent legal fight 
arising from the decision of policy makers to utilize nuclear energy.  The 
history of nuclear energy is in large part a creation of government policy.  
Government decisions have been responsible for the Manhattan Project, 
the nuclear navy, and the fact that one-fifth of our electricity is generated 
by nuclear energy.12  Today, government support includes billions of 
dollars in government loan guarantees for investors in new nuclear plants 
                                                                                                                          
7 Id. at 258. 
8 Pub. L. No. 97-425, §114(d), 96 Stat. 2201, 2215 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
10101–10270 (2006)). 
9 Final Brief for the Respondents at 44–45, In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255 (No. 11-1271). 
10 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 21, In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255 (No. 11-1271). 
11 In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 259.  
12 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/NE-0139, NUCLEAR ENERGY —DEPEND ON IT 1 (2011). 
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as well as the continued promise made in the Price-Anderson Act of 195713 
to limit the liability of any nuclear operator for an accident committed by a 
private or public actor.14 
Currently, sixty-two operating nuclear plants15 and eleven 
decommissioned nuclear plants16 store spent nuclear fuel (SNF), which is a 
byproduct from electricity generation.17  The DOE maintains a handful of 
sites that store SNF and high-level radioactive waste that are the byproduct 
of research, nuclear weapon reactors, and navy ship reactors.18  Both 
proponents of nuclear energy and their environmental critics agree that the 
nation needs a permanent solution to dispose of SNF and high-level 
radioactive waste.19  The question of where to put nuclear waste has been 
discussed since World War II.20  The majority of the nation’s SNF is kept 
in cooling pools on-site at the reactors, where it awaits an answer to the 
problem.21  The alternative to keeping fuel rods in the cooling pools is 
placing them in dry casks.  All decommissioned nuclear plants that no 
longer produce electricity have been forced to seal their fuel rods in these 
casks made of metal and cement that stand up to twenty feet tall.22  Nuclear 
                                                                                                                          
13 Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006)). 
14 Megan Easley, Note, Standing in Nuclear Waste: Challenging the Disposal of Yucca Mountain, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 664 (2012). 
15 See NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NUREG-1350, INFORMATION DIGEST 2013–2014 
app. A (2013) (providing the latest list of operating nuclear reactors).  
16 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY 
36 (2012). 
17 When electricity is produced from nuclear energy, unstable uranium rods are used to boil water 
in a reactor that creates the steam that turns the electric turbine.  Scott R. Helton, Comment, The Legal 
Problems of Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposal, 23 ENERGY L.J. 179, 180 (2002).  When the rods lose too 
much energy and can no longer be used to generate electricity they are placed in cooling pools because 
they still maintain enough radioactivity to cause a meltdown if not properly managed.  Id.  The terms 
“spent nuclear fuel,” “SNF,” “spent fuel rods,” “high-level radioactive waste,” and “nuclear waste” 
pose the same threats and challenges and may be used interchangeably in this Note.  
18 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 17–18.  
19 See, e.g., Marvin Fertel, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Nuclear Energy Inst., State of the 
Industry at the 2013 Nuclear Energy Assembly (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.nei.org/News-
Media/Speeches/Marvin-Fertel,-President-and-CEO,-Nuclear-Energy-I (advocating for a review of the 
license application for Yucca Mountain and the necessary legislation to renew a commitment to fuel 
disposal); Adam Russell, Federal Court Ruling Means Yucca Mountain Project Is Dead, According to 
Friends of the Earth, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.foe.org/news/archives/2013-
08-fed-court-ruling-means-yucca-mountain-project-is-dead (“There should be a real national 
conversation about how to move forward with the selection of a repository site for the deadly waste 
generated by nuclear power . . . .”). 
20 Tom Kenny, Note, Where to Put It All? Opening the Judicial Road for a Long-Term Solution to 
the Nation’s Nuclear Waste Problem, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2011). 
21 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 14. 
22 See id. at 16, 34 (discussing dry storage practices and noting that casks have walls up to three 
feet thick and weigh up to 360,000 pounds); Cate Lecuyer, Yankee Gets OK for Dry Cask Storage, 
REFORMER.COM (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.reformer.com/headlines/ci_3756755 (reporting licensing 
approval of twenty foot tall dry casks at the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant); Dry Cask Storage 
Project Underway at Fermi 2, DTE ENERGY, http://www.dteenergy.com/nuclear/dryCaskStorageProje
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plants in operation today have placed some of their spent fuel rods into dry 
casks, but due to the additional cost, lack of guidance, and unknown future 
regulations of waste management, they have chosen to keep the majority of 
spent fuel rods in the cooling pools.23 
Both methods of temporary storage require licensing approval by the 
NRC, the agency tasked with ensuring safe operating standards of all 
civilian nuclear plants.24  If a permanent repository existed today, the NRC 
could demand that plant operators take such action necessary to minimize 
temporary storage in favor of the permanent solution.  Absent a long-term 
storage solution, extension after extension has been granted to licensees of 
dry casks and cooling pools; these temporary storage solutions are now 
holding SNF far beyond the expected timeframe of twenty to thirty years.25 
As is true with all things nuclear related, the partial core meltdown at 
Three Mile Island in 1979 initiated changes for how nuclear waste is 
regulated.  Less than two months after the Three Mile Island meltdown, the 
D.C. Circuit held that the NRC could not extend the operating license of a 
nuclear plant without a plan for handling radioactive waste.26  The NRC 
responded to the decision by amending its draft rule on the disposal of 
nuclear waste that had been in the works for the previous seven years.27  
Still, Congress did not pass meaningful legislation until 1983 when it 
passed the NWPA, which directed the DOE to develop a plan, choose a 
location, and construct a permanent waste repository for all of the nation’s 
high-level radioactive waste by 1998.28 
                                                                                                                          
ct.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (making note of the twenty foot tall casks stored at the Enrico Fermi 
nuclear power plant). 
23 See Spent Fuel Storage in Pools and Dry Casks Key Points and Questions & Answers, U.S. 
NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/faqs.html#4 (last updated Mar. 
25, 2013) (reporting that as of 2009, 78% of spent nuclear waste was in spent fuel pools and 22% was 
in dry casks).  In the United States there are 50,000 metric tons of SNF in cooling pools, and 15,000 
metric tons in dry casks.  BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 10–
11.   
24 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b), (h) (2006). 
25 See, e.g., Waste Confidence Decision Review, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,790 (Sept. 28, 1989) 
(codified as amended at 10 C.F.R. § 51 (2013)) (finding that a delay of repository until 2025 will not 
pose a significant risk to public safety or the environment); BD. ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL 8–9 (1990) 
(determining that nuclear waste can be safely stored at the reactor sites for at least one hundred years); 
BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 34 (explaining how the NRC 
amended its Waste Confidence Decision in 2010 to permit extensions of SNF in temporary storage for 
up to sixty years). 
26 Minnesota v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n., 602 F.2d 412, 416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
27 Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,372, 61,373 (Oct. 25, 1979). 
28 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 97-425, §§ 111, 112, 114, 115, 145, 302(a)(5)(b), 96 
Stat. 2201, 2207–2220, 2258 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§  10101–10270 (2006)). 
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B.  The Nuclear Waste Policy Act:  Congress’s Long-Term Plan for Spent 
Nuclear Fuel 
The NWPA divided the responsibility of establishing the repository 
among three separate agencies.  The DOE would generate a list of potential 
sites for “site characterization”—the process of conducting intensive 
geological examination that tests the physical suitability of a site.29  The 
EPA would set radiological release standards by determining a safe level 
of radioactivity, if any, that might escape from a nuclear repository.30  The 
NRC would use the EPA’s standards to determine whether the DOE 
characterized sites met public health and safety regulations and whether a 
license should be issued.31  If approved, the DOE would be in charge of 
construction and maintenance.32 
To pay for the development and construction of the repository, the 
NWPA authorized the Secretary of Energy to enter contracts with plant 
operators and charge a fee on all electricity generated by nuclear reactors.33  
Although plant operators are contractually obligated to pay one-tenth of 
one cent per kilowatt-hour generated into the Nuclear Waste Fund,34 the 
fee is passed on to the consumers.  Over nearly thirty years, electricity 
customers have contributed $16 billion to the Nuclear Waste Fund,35 
which, when accounting for interest, totals $28 billion currently available 
to finance a permanent repository.36  In consideration for the fee payments, 
the federal government promised plant operators that it would begin 
accepting SNF for storage by January 31, 1998.37 
The NWPA required the Secretary of Energy to nominate five sites for 
a permanent repository, and to take into consideration hydrology, 
geophysics, seismic activity, nuclear activity of the military, valuable 
natural resources, proximity to water supplies, and the proximity to 
populations.38  The Act further requires a full environmental assessment, 
and public hearings of each candidate site.39  By 1984, the DOE had 
nominated nine candidate sites and produced draft environmental 
                                                                                                                          
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 10132, 10133 (2006). 
30 Id. § 10141(a). 
31 Id. §§ 10134(d), 10141(b). 
32 Id. § 10107(b)(2). 
33 Id. § 10156(a)(1)–(3). 
34 Id. § 10222(a)(1)–(2).  
35 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 70–71. 
36 RICKEY R. HASS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S 
NUCLEAR WASTE FUND’S FISCAL YEAR 2012 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 8 (2012).    
37 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5). 
38 Id. § 10132(a), (b)(1)(A).  
39 Id. § 10132(b)(1)(D), (b)(2). 
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assessments for each.40  More than a year behind the statutory deadline, the 
DOE narrowed its list for characterization to sites in Texas, Washington, 
and Yucca Mountain in Nevada.41 
In 1987, Congress intervened in the site selection process and passed 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act that prohibited characterization 
of any site other than Yucca Mountain.42  The process was driven more by 
politics and NIMBY’ism43 than science.44  Congressional members from 
the eastern states supported passage on the condition that the Act was 
amended to scratch the plan for a second repository that would likely be 
cited on the opposite side of the country from Yucca.  Those from South 
Carolina and Tennessee had objections because their states were expected 
to host short-term storage facilities, and they feared that their states would 
become the de facto permanent repositories if Yucca had serious delays.45  
These votes were picked up by amending the legislation to prohibit the 
operation of any short-term storage until the permanent repository was 
licensed46—a move that proved costly because now the government has no 
ability to remove waste from nuclear plants.  In the end, the Act had 
something for everyone except the people of Nevada. 
C.  Nominating Yucca and the Litigation Fallout 
Congress’s move to limit consideration of repository sites to Yucca 
Mountain did not repeal the procedural provisions of the NWPA.  The 
selection process still required the DOE to perform environmental testing 
and solicit concerns from the local community before it could nominate a 
site to the President. 
The people of Nevada launched every legislative and legal grenade 
                                                                                                                          
40 Availability of Draft Environmental Assessments for Proposed Site Nominations and 
Announcement of Public Information Meetings and Hearings, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,540 (Dec. 20, 1984). 
41 Thomas A. Cotton, Nuclear Waste Story: Setting the Stage, in UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: 
YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE NATION’S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE 29, 31–32 (Allison M. 
Macfarlane & Rodney C. Ewing eds., 2006). 
42 Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5011(a), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-228 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 10172 (2006)).   
43 “NIMBY” stands for “not in my back yard,” and is commonly used to summarize the attitude 
of opponents to power plants, garbage dumps, prisons, wind farms, and other utilities that improve the 
public welfare but are opposed solely for the proposed location. 
44 For example, Congressman Al Swift (D-WA) was upset that Congress would undermine a 
process grounded in scientific facts, but was still inclined to vote for the legislation out of fear that the 
collective action from other members would limit the location of a repository to Washington if he too 
did not act for his own parochial interest.  Nevada: Nuclear Waste Site, 1987–1988 Legislative 
Chronology, 7 CONGRESS & NATION 483, 487 (1989).  The bill’s leading advocate, Chairman J. 
Bennett Johnston (D-LA) of the Senate Energy Committee, highlighted the cost benefits of a plan that 
tested only one site, and committed the nation pending positive test results because the cost to test the 
geological suitability of a site was $1 to $2 billion.  Id. at 483. 
45 Id. at 484. 
46 Id. 
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they could to block Congress’s plan to build a permanent repository within 
their state.47  State elected officials first passed legislation prohibiting the 
designation of Yucca as the repository, which was struck down by the 
Ninth Circuit.48  They then argued the DOE environmental impact study 
failed to consider the threats of transporting nuclear waste to Yucca.49  
Again, the courts refused to allow the state from blocking further 
progress.50  Opponents then successfully litigated against the EPA 
standards used to conduct an environmental impact study.51  The EPA and 
the NRC were forced to adopt standards that could safely store nuclear 
waste for one million years instead of the original standard requiring ten 
thousand years.52  But this victory for Nevada only delayed the process. 
Fifteen years after Congress declared Yucca as the only site for 
characterization, the DOE nominated the site to President George W. Bush 
in 2002.53  President Bush approved the site within a day, and the 
congressional approval required by the NWPA54 was achieved within five 
months.55  Six years later, on June 3, 2008, after a $12 billion 
characterization, the DOE submitted its license application for Yucca to 
the NRC.56  The NWPA provides that the NRC has three years to review 
the application,57 which gave it until June 3, 2011, to issue a decision.   
Up until 2008, the plan for a nuclear waste repository in Nevada never 
suffered from a lack of support in Washington, but Nevada was not going 
to give up.  Five months after the DOE delivered the application to the 
NRC, Barack Obama was elected President.  He, along with every 
Democratic candidate for President, had promised Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid (D-NV) and the people of Nevada that he would oppose a 
permanent nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain.58  As discussed 
                                                                                                                          
47 Easley, supra note 14, at 668–69. 
48 Nevada ex rel. Loux v. Herrington, 777 F.2d 529, 536 (9th Cir. 1985). 
49 Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
50 Id. at 93–94. 
51 See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding, inter 
alia, that the EPA violated the Energy Policy Act when it determined 10,000 years was a long enough 
safety standard for the integrity of a nuclear waste repository). 
52 Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 
73 Fed. Reg. 61,256 (Oct. 15, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 197 (2013)). 
53 Letter from Spencer Abraham, Sec’y of Energy, to the President of the United States 
Recommending the Yucca Mountain Site for a Repository Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
(Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-energy/issues/yucca-
mountain/letter-to-the-president_salp_ocrwm_doe_gov.pdf. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(2)(A), (b) (2006). 
55 Joint Resolution of July 23, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735.  
56 Yucca Mountain; Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application, 73 Fed Reg. 34,348 (June 
17, 2008).  The application is available at www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app.html.   
57 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d). 
58 See Michael J. Mishak & J. Patrick Coolican, Democrats on Yucca Mountain, LAS VEGAS SUN, 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/politics/voterguide/2008/democrats/issues/yucca/ (last visited Sept. 23, 
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below in Part II.E, the President has fully honored his campaign promise.   
D.  Breaching the Duty to Act by the NWPA Deadline 
As the DOE was fighting delays to the site selection process, it was 
simultaneously failing to meet its contractual obligations to accept SNF by 
the 1998 statutory deadline set by the NWPA.  In 1994, the DOE issued a 
Notice of Inquiry that it would not accept waste at a repository until 2010 
at the earliest, twelve years after the deadline.59  Twenty states and fourteen 
plant operators sued the DOE that year in an effort to get the government 
on a faster path to a permanent repository.60  Parties filing lawsuits wanted 
to get rid of the nuclear waste as soon as possible, and they had a strong 
argument that the DOE had a legal obligation to take it away.   
In 1995, the D.C. Circuit held that the DOE had an unconditional 
statutory obligation to meet the 1998 deadline.61  The DOE responded by 
essentially ignoring the court’s opinion, arguing that although it had 
breached the contracts, it was permitted to do so given factors out of its 
control.62  The matter found its way back before the D.C. Circuit, which 
held the government is obligated to pay for damages arising out of 
breached contracts.63  When the deadline passed a few months later, the 
DOE officially breached all of its contracts made under the NWPA.  As of 
November 2012, the DOE had paid $2.6 billion resulting from final 
judgments and settlements, and it expects to pay an additional $19.7 billion 
to resolve the remaining cases—many parties have already won on the 
merits and the outstanding issue to be litigated is the amount of damages.64 
As the federal government was failing to uphold its side of the 
contracts, operators of nuclear plants were approaching the end of their 
original permits to hold SNF in the cooling pools.  Operators had the 
option of applying to the NRC for extensions, which permitted them to 
                                                                                                                          
2013) (quoting then-presidential candidate Barack Obama as stating “Yucca is a bad idea”; Hillary 
Clinton as stating “I’ve been against Yucca Mountain from the beginning, and I’m working with Harry 
Reid to try to starve it to death”; and John Edwards as stating “[nuclear waste] has to be kept and stored 
where it’s produced”). 
59 Notice of Inquiry: Waste Acceptance Issues, 59 Fed. Reg. 27,007, 27,007–08 (May 25, 1994). 
60 Editorial, Forcing a Decision on Nuclear Waste, CHI. TRIB. (July 24, 1994), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-07-24/news/9407240181_1_central-storage-facility-site-at-
yucca-mountain-nuclear-power. 
61 Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
62 See Kenny, supra note 20, at 1328 (noting the DOE’s argument that “technical problems; 
regulatory delays; roadblocks to implementation of [an interim facility]; funding restrictions; litigation 
delays; and consultation requirements” were all uncontrollable by the DOE and that the contracts 
permitted such force majeure-like defenses (alteration in original) (quoting N. States Power Co. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997))). 
63 N. States Power Co., 128 F.3d at 760–61.  
64 HASS, supra note 36, at 19–20.  The nuclear industry estimates actual total damages will exceed 
$50 billion.  Id. at 20.  
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store increasing amounts of spent fuel rods in the cooling pools, or for 
permission to transfer the fuel rods to steel-lined cement dry casks.65   
Even if the NRC had extended licenses to store SNF at nuclear plants 
indefinitely, the plant operators would still be in position to sue the DOE 
for breaching the contractual deadline given the costs of indefinitely 
holding SNF.  Extended licenses have costs associated with expanding on-
site dry cask storage, fitting more spent fuel rods into cooling pools, re-
licensing these activities, and the liabilities that come with holding spent 
fuel.66  As these costs add up, the financial fallout from the DOE’s breach 
will cost taxpayers billions of dollars.  The DOE has entered seventy-two 
contracts to accept SNF and high-level radioactive waste, and the damages 
and liabilities are estimated to cost taxpayers $500 million each year in 
settlement and damages until a permanent solution is available.67  Through 
2011, seventy-eight claims had been filed against the DOE.68  If planning 
and construction of the repository were to move forward immediately 
without further delays, total damages at the time of expected completion in 
2020 would be $20.8 billion.69  But that is an unrealistic expectation given 
the political environment, and that the DOE has most recently established a 
goal of opening interim storage facilities that could accept the waste by 
2025.70 
E.  Funding for Nuclear Waste Management 
The Obama Administration has taken many steps to block the NRC 
from approving the DOE application for Yucca.  The President appointed 
Senator Reid’s former staffer to head the NRC;71 had the DOE withdraw 
the application, only to have such action held to be in violation of the 
NWPA;72 and established a Blue Ribbon Commission to review alternative 
solutions to the nation’s nuclear waste problem.73  As discussed below, the 
President did one more thing to block Yucca: he coordinated with 
Congress to stop funding the review of the DOE application. 
                                                                                                                          
65 See Kenny, supra note 20, at 1321–22. 
66 See, e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 655 F.3d 1319, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that a nuclear plant operator was entitled to such indirect overhead costs as “plant security, 
emergency response systems, lease payments, regulatory fees . . . [and] salaries” in addition to the 
direct costs associated with building dry cask storage).   
67 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 80. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 DEP’T OF ENERGY, STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL 
AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 2 (2013).   
71 Obama Picks Nuclear Panel Leader, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 14, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/us/politics/14brfs-OBAMAPICKSNU_BRF.html?_r=0. 
72 U.S. Dep’t of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), 71 N.R.C. 609, 629 (2010). 
73 President Barack Obama, Memorandum on the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s 
Nuclear Future, 75 Fed. Reg. 5485 (Feb. 3, 2010). 
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Projects spanning multiple appropriation cycles often fall victim to 
changing congressional priorities and the inability of participants to know 
what financing will be provided from year to year.  Government agencies 
suffer from the inability to retain specialists, schedule projects in the most 
efficient order, or sign longer-term contracts with vendors that would 
provide more service for the same amount of taxpayer dollars.  Proponents 
of the NWPA hoped to overcome these obstacles by creating the self-
sustaining Nuclear Waste Fund.  Although the fund holds over $28 
billion,74 the NWPA requires Congress to first appropriate money from the 
fund to agencies before they may make expenditures.75  Thus, today 
Congress could provide the NRC and the DOE with all the necessary 
funding to complete a repository without increasing taxes, increaseing the 
national debt, or shifting funds away from other programs.   
It is hard to know exactly how much the NRC will need to complete its 
review of the DOE application for Yucca.  The best cost estimate for a 
program can usually be found in the latest budget request by the NRC to 
the Office of Management and Budget.76  However, since 2010 the annual 
budget requests have reflected the political objective of the Administration 
to stop Yucca.77  In 2009, before political influences prevented the NRC 
from preparing a full faith review of the DOE application, the agency 
estimated it would need $99.1 million for the coming year.78  Congress 
appropriated $29 million for FY 2010 and $10 million for FY 2011.79  
NRC’s funding request was reduced to zero dollars for FYs 2012 and 
2013, as reflected by White House policy.80  With no surprise, Congress 
appropriated zero dollars in each year.81  Today the NRC has only $11.1 
million in carryover funds to conduct its review of the DOE application.82  
Not surprisingly, the nuclear industry is outraged that the Waste Fund’s 
collection of fees continues while the process of building a repository has 
                                                                                                                          
74 HASS, supra note 36, at 8.  
75 42 U.S.C. § 10222(e)(2) (2006). 
76 Before the President delivers his budget to Congress, government agencies report their requests 
for the next fiscal year to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  31 U.S.C. § 1108 (2006).  It 
is OMB policy not to publicize the initial budget requests submitted by agencies.  See OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-11, § 22 (2013).  However, the 
NRC’s requests for FY 2010, FY 2011, and FY 2012 were discussed in the Inspector General’s report 
made public by earlier litigation.  See Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 18 n.14. 
77 See Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 44–45 (noting that available funding for 
the NRC’s review process is far below the estimated $99.1 million annual appropriation necessary for 
an adequate review of the DOE application). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 18–20. 
80 See supra note 58 and text accompanying notes 71–73.  
81 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 127 
Stat. 198 (funding all programs not mentioned in the bill at FY 2012 levels); see also Final Brief for the 
Respondents, supra note 9, at 21 (noting funds for FY 2012 were zero). 
82 In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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completely broken down.83 
The DOE, which the government argues is a necessary participant in 
NRC’s review of the application, has also seen its funding for Yucca 
zeroed out in appropriations.  There are 288 outstanding contentions that 
the DOE must answer and defend as part of its responsibility to litigate its 
application.84  As the applicant, the DOE bears the burden of appearing 
before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), an independent 
trial-level adjudicatory body within the NRC, and responding to any 
contention from a party with standing.85  Congress appropriated $390 
million total to the DOE for FY 2008,86 which has steadily declined to 
$288 million for FY 2009, $197 million for FY 2010,87 $10 million for 
FY2011, $0 for FY 2012,88 and $0 for FY 2013.89 
Although the final appropriation bills coming out of Congress in recent 
years have prevented further action on the application, many congressional 
members still support Yucca.  The House passed an appropriation bill in 
the summer of 2011 that provided $25 million to the NRC to review 
Yucca.90  The bill explicitly forbade the use of any appropriated funds “to 
conduct closure of adjudicatory functions, technical review, or support 
activities associated with the Yucca Mountain geologic repository license 
application . . . or for actions that irrevocably remove the possibility that 
Yucca Mountain may be a repository option in the future.”91  The funding 
and language in the House version of the bill did not survive the 
conference committee.92 
                                                                                                                          
83 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16, at 74. 
84 Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 27. 
85 10 C.F.R. § 2.325 (2013). 
86 Pub. L. No. 110-161, tit. 3, 121 Stat. 1844, 1960, 1964 (2007) (appropriating $189 million from 
the Waste Fund, and $201 million from the general fund). 
87 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 71 
(2010), available at http:// www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy11/pdf/budget.pdf. 
88 Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 20–22.   
89 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 127 
Stat. 198 (funding all programs not mentioned in the bill at FY 2012 levels). 
90 H.R. 2354, 112th Cong., tit. 3 (as passed by House, July 15, 2011).  The Energy and Water 
Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act is one of twelve annual appropriation bills, and 
encompasses funding for hundreds of programs.  SANDY STREETER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, 
THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (2007).  Passage of the bill in 
the House does not suggest that a majority of House members support the quoted language on Yucca; it 
suggests that there is enough influence in the majority to support such language.  Whether a majority of 
House members support a permanent repository at Yucca cannot be ascertained by up-or-down votes 
on appropriation packages.  
91 H.R. 2354, 112th Cong., § 604. 
92 Compare id. (appropriating $25 million for the NRC’s review of the DOE application for FY 
2012), with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (making no 
appropriations or policy reference to Yucca in the final FY 2012 appropriation package passed by 
Congress).  
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F.  The NRC’s Refusal to Act on the DOE Application 
NRC has missed its statutory three-year deadline of June 3, 2011, and 
does not plan to review the DOE application unless adequate funding is 
provided.  It is undisputed that $11.1 million is inadequate to complete an 
assessment of the DOE application, but there are other political 
considerations at play as well.  In 2010, the Obama Administration had the 
DOE withdraw its 2008 application.93  The ASLB held that the withdrawal 
violated the NWPA.94  The five commissioners of the NRC can reverse the 
ASLB, but they never made a ruling after the ASLB decision.95 In 
unorthodox fashion, Gregory Jaczko—Chairman at the time and a former 
staffer of Senator Reid96—held the five commissioner’s review of the 
ASLB decision open indefinitely because he did not have the votes to 
reverse its decision.97  Instead, Jaczko ordered a closure of the review 
process, and the petitioners alleged it was an illegal action that shut down 
the licensing process before Congress was able to eliminate funding to the 
DOE and the NRC.98  The Office of the Inspector General issued a report 
finding that Jaczko misled the other Commissioners of his intentions and 
delayed the Commissions action, but that he did not violate any laws.99 
In response to the Administration’s continuous obstruction of Yucca 
Mountain, a coalition of industry stakeholders and municipalities initiated 
more litigation to force the government to abide by its statutory mandate.  
On July 29, 2011, Aiken County, South Carolina, along with other 
municipalities, states, individuals, and energy trade groups filed suit 
against the NRC seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the NRC to resume 
its review of Yucca Mountain using the funds it has left.100  The $11.1 
million remaining funds makes for an interesting set of facts—if the NRC 
had already expended all its appropriated dollars, the petitioners in In re 
Aiken County would not be asking for a writ of mandamus compelling 
NRC to act, although many would still be in position to seek damages.  If 
the NRC had more remaining funds, say perhaps an amount closer to the 
$99.1 million number it requested for FY 2010, the NRC could not have 
argued that it should be permitted to disregard a statutory mandate due to 
inadequate funds. 
On August 3, 2012, the D.C. Circuit ordered the case to be held in 
                                                                                                                          
93 Kimberly A. Strassel, Nuclear Politics, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2011, at A13. 
94 U.S. Dep’t of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), 71 N.R.C. 609, 629 (2010). 
95 Strassel, supra note 93. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 10, at 11–12. 
99 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG CASE NO. 11-05, NRC CHAIRMAN’S UNILATERAL 
DECISION TO TERMINATE NRC’S REVIEW OF DOE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY LICENSE 
APPLICATION 44–46 (2011). 
100 Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 28, In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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abeyance to give Congress time to resolve the inconsistency between the 
mandate and appropriations law.101  After Congress failed to address the 
issue, the court had to answer whether the NRC was wrong to violate a 
statutory mandate when the available funds were inadequate to complete 
the mandate. 
III.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS 
A.  Issuing a Writ of Mandamus 
Courts have historically issued writs of mandamus and injunctions to 
compel agencies to act when they unreasonably delay or disregard 
statutory mandates.102  Congress confirmed this authority of the courts and 
used it as a basis for constructing judicial review of agency actions when it 
passed the APA.103  The APA directs courts to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”104  A writ of mandamus is 
not without its limitations; a court has no authority to demand that 
Congress provide an agency with additional funds to meet a statutory 
mandate or that agencies use resources in a more efficient manner.105  A 
writ of mandamus is also not a substitute for the tools that courts may use 
to force unwilling government institutions to resolve infringements of 
constitutional rights, such as school desegregation or prison conditions.106 
A court will not issue a writ of mandamus for every act that violates a 
                                                                                                                          
101 In re Aiken Cnty., No. 11-1271, 2012 WL 3140360, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
102 See e.g., Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591–92 (1926) (affirming an injunction that 
prohibited the Illinois Commerce Commission from delaying its review of telephone rate increases); 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n. v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474, 485 (1912) 
(affirming a writ of mandamus to compel action by the ICC).  
103 See generally Carol R. Miaskoff, Note, Judicial Review of Agency Delay and Inaction Under 
Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 635, 636–42 (1987) 
(reviewing the legislative history of § 706(1) of the APA). 
104 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).  The legislative history shows that § 706(1) was based on the writ of 
mandamus and the All Writs Act.  Miaskoff, supra note 103, at 640. 
105 In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
106 The authority of federal courts to force the hand of unwilling state and local governments 
expanded with Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955), but 
remains weak and dependent on the willingness of a government institution to obey a court order.  
When government inaction demands court intervention, the courts take a quasi-executive enforcement 
role.  They may hold officials in contempt, order third parties to sequester funds, appoint a receiver to 
administrator school boards, or dissolve institutions.  Ridgway, supra note 3, at 101–02.  The necessary 
actions by states to address desegregation or prison overcrowding are costly endeavors, but cost and 
resource limitations are never an excuse.  Id. at 97.  The Supreme Court even held that a court might 
prohibit a municipality’s tax and spending measures.  Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 
(1964).  Such options available to force government action that stop the infringement of constitutional 
rights are not available for agency delay of a statutory mandate. 
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statute.  The writ is preserved for “extraordinary circumstances,”107 when 
the agency has a “clear duty to act” and the petitioner has a “clear right to 
relief.”108  Because a mandamus is an equitable remedy, courts consider 
practical considerations such as “timing, resources, and efficacy.”109   
B.  Agency Delay in the Face of a Statutory Mandate 
Courts extend considerable deference to agency decisions.110  Unless 
otherwise stipulated in the authorizing statute, an agency decision is 
reviewable under sections 701 to 706 of the APA.111  Section 701(a)(2) 
exempts agency actions from judicial review that are “committed to agency 
discretion by law.”112  The Supreme Court held in Lincoln v. Vigil113 that 
there is no judicial review of how an agency spends its appropriated dollars 
when such action is committed to agency discretion by law.114  The Indian 
Health Service, an agency within the Department of Health and Human 
Services, had been operating a pilot health care program for children in the 
Southwest under legislation authorizing a nation wide program.115  
Congress funded the program with the intention that such funds would be 
used to serve populations only in the Southwest pilot, but it never re-
addressed the authorizing legislation that had a national scope.116  
Recipients of health care in the Southwest who lost services when the 
Indian Health Service began stretching the funds on a nationwide program 
brought suit.117  The Court held that such action was not subject to judicial 
review because such action was “committed to agency discretion by 
                                                                                                                          
107 Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v Daiflon, 
Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)). 
108 Id. (quoting Power v. Barnhart, , 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
109 In re Aiken Cnty., No. 11-1271, 2012 WL 3140360, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
110 Agency discretion can be viewed as being extended by courts, or it can be viewed as an 
extension of legislative authority provided by Congress—the two viewpoints do not conflict.  For 
example, when Congress passed the Clean Air Act, it directed the EPA to determine air standards that 
“allow[] an adequate margin of safety . . . to protect the public health.”  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).  
This open standard gave the EPA considerable discretion to determine what volume of a particular 
pollutant in the air crosses the threshold of harming the public health; and the EPA need not consider 
the economic implications of the standards it decides.  When challenged, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress can delegate its authority to agencies.  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 
474–75 (2001).  Agencies have unreviewable enforcement discretion unless the statute tailors the 
agency’s discretion.  A statutory deadline, such as the one that required an NRC decision within three 
years, is one way to tailor the discretion of an agency. 
111 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012). 
112 Id. § 701(a)(2). 
113 508 U.S. 182 (1993).  
114 Id. at 193. 
115 Id. at 185–87. 
116 Id. at 186–88. 
117 Id. at 189. 
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law.”118 
The seminal case on agency discretion is Heckler v. Chaney,119 which 
addressed whether an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.120  The Supreme Court reasoned 
that deference to agency decisions is appropriate because: (1) agencies are 
experts in their fields and judges are not in a position to balance the 
competing demands for the limited resources at an agency’s disposal; (2) 
when an agency fails to act, its decision generally does not threaten the 
right of an individual deserving the protection of the courts; and (3) the 
doctrine of separation of powers left the executive branch with 
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”121  In 
Chaney, the Court held that an agency decision whether to enforce a 
violation of a law is unreviewable by the courts under section 701(a)(2) of 
the APA.122  Courts simply do not have the expertise to second-guess the 
thousands of decisions made each day by government agencies.   
The Supreme Court has not addressed when an agency’s delay 
demands a writ of mandamus by the courts.  The issue remains marked by 
inconsistencies in the courts, and scholars have noted that academia has 
also failed to provide helpful guidance.123 The factors considered by the 
Court in Chaney regarding agency inaction parallel factors considered by 
courts looking at agency delay.  Whereas Chaney is well-established 
Supreme Court doctrine uniformly followed by lower courts, the principle 
of agency deference should guide courts when considering charges of 
agency delay. 
Professor Richard Pierce argues that the judiciary has responsibility to 
take an active role in crafting remedies that address agency delay in the 
face of inadequate resources.124  He predicted in 1997 that agencies would 
forever have constantly diminishing resources to comply with statutory 
mandates because Congress faces myriad political demands that call for 
spending cuts and the exercise of Congress’s power to set mandates.125  
                                                                                                                          
118 Id. at 193 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988)). 
119 470 U.S. 821 (1985).  
120 Id. at 826.  
121 Id. at 831–32 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
122 Id. at 837. 
123 See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN L. 
REV. 1, 4, 11 (2008) (arguing that judicial review of agency inaction and delay is “incoherent” because 
the courts wrongfully treat agency action and inaction differently); Ridgway, supra note 3, at 94 
(“Concrete guidance for judicial intervention is rare.”); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: 
How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-
Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1388 (2011) (“The approach developed in the lower courts is 
ad hoc, incoherent, and difficult to apply consistently.”). 
124 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency 
Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 90 (1997). 
125 Id. at 64–66. 
 2013] AN ALTERNATIVE TO IN RE AIKEN COUNTY 349 
Applying the principals from Chaney, Pierce favors more discretion for 
agencies because courts are ill equipped to strike the balance among the 
many statutory demands on agencies with their limited resources.126  Using 
the 14,000 decisions with statutory deadlines made annually by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service as his example, Pierce points out 
the reality that a good majority of agency decisions do not come before 
federal courts when a deadline is missed.127  Pierce would give agencies 
the discretion to delay, except in circumstances where Congress specifies a 
statutory deadline.128  He believes statutory deadlines demonstrate 
Congress’s intent and its rejection of the idea that a lack of agency 
resources is a reasonable excuse to delay.129   
Professor Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio contends that agency delay is an 
unavoidable cost of the administrative state, and that Congress and the 
Executive are better equipped than the courts to address the issue.130  
Nonetheless, Sant’Ambrogio concludes that all three branches of the 
government have a responsibility to address agency delay, and that courts 
should make a contribution by using a cost-benefit analysis.131  Anchoring 
his conclusions in the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA,132 he argues that any delay in agency rulemaking must be grounded 
in the substantive law and not other policy considerations, no matter how 
practical the policy may be.133  So long as the delay to the rulemaking is 
supportive of the underlying objectives of the law, deference should be 
given to the agency.   
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA argued that it should be permitted to 
delay its determination whether the Clean Air Act requires regulation of 
greenhouse gasses because the executive branch initiated voluntary 
programs to address global warming and further action under the Act 
would impair international negotiations to reduce emissions.134  The Court 
refused to consider these policy considerations unaddressed by the Act and 
held that the EPA had a duty under the Act to determine whether 
greenhouse gas emissions harmed the public health and welfare.135   
Looking at Massachusetts v. EPA as well, Andrew Schwentker argues 
that an agency has unfettered discretion to delay rulemaking indefinitely if 
                                                                                                                          
126 Id. at 92–93.  
127 Id. at 85. 
128 Id. at 93.  
129 Id. 
130 Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 123, at 1430–32. 
131 Id. at 1435–36. 
132 549 U.S. 497 (2007).   
133 Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 123, at 1436. 
134 549 U.S. at 533.   
135 Id. at 534–35. 
 350 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:331 
it determines it has inadequate resources.136  In essence, such an argument 
could have given the EPA a way to avoid the Court’s order to comply.  
Schwentker’s argument is another option for agencies with pre-textual 
motives, political or otherwise, that wish to delay statutory mandates.  He 
did not suggest such deference applies to statutory deadlines in an 
adjudicatory process as is the case in In re Aiken County, but there are 
similar factors in both scenarios. 
To better appreciate the factors courts apply when considering whether 
an agency’s action is unlawfully delayed, this Note looks beyond the 
scholarly articles to federal cases.  In 1976, the plaintiffs in Open 
America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force137 sued the FBI when the 
agency response rate to document requests was months behind the thirty-
day deadline established by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).138  
The FBI argued that it was doing the best it could with a backlog of 5,000 
requests and no additional funding from Congress to manage the new 
obligation imposed by the Act.139  When Congress passed FOIA it had 
estimated that each agency would bear an additional $100,000 in workload 
costs to meet the public demand for government documents.140  Instead of 
appropriating additional funds for each agency, Congress intended that 
agencies would use their general funding to respond to requests.141  The 
demand on the FBI greatly exceeded those predictions, and the level of 
requests cost $2,675,000 in the first year of FOIA’s implementation.142  
The court’s decision was relatively lenient: given the FBI’s limited 
resources, it was permitted to ignore its statutory deadline to the extent it 
made a good faith effort to respond to FOIA requests in the order they 
were received.143 
In 1984, the D.C. Circuit articulated the “TRAC factors” in 
Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC) v. FCC.144  These 
factors offer guidance on whether an agency’s delay is so egregious that a 
court must issue a writ of mandamus.  The plaintiffs in TRAC filed suit 
against the FCC after the agency failed to rule on the validity of 
overcharge fees assessed on AT&T customers more than four years after 
the bills were paid.145  The Court formulated six factors that previous 
                                                                                                                          
136 R. Andrew Schwentker, Essay, Mandating Unfunded Mandates? Agency Discretion in 
Rulemaking After Massachusetts v. EPA, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1444, 1447 (2008). 
137 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
138 Id. at 608. 
139 Id. at 613. 
140 Id. at 612. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 616.  But see Pierce, supra note 124, at 93 (favoring considerable deference to agency 
decisions, but not when Congress sets a statutory deadline). 
144 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
145 Id. at 72. 
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courts had applied and that are appropriate for review of an agency delay:  
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be 
governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has 
provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with 
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling 
statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule 
of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of 
economic regulation are less tolerable when human health 
and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the 
effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a 
higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take 
into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced 
by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety 
lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency 
action is unreasonably delayed.146 
After laying out the comprehensive TRAC factors, the court reasoned that 
the factors did not have to be applied to the case at hand because the FCC 
assured the court that it would take proper remedial steps in the near 
future.147  The court avoided what appeared to be a ripe opportunity to 
provide a clear standard for later courts to determine when a writ of 
mandamus is appropriate to address agency delays.  However, had the 
court applied the factors and found a writ of mandamus appropriate, a 
judgment ordering the agency to act would not have been much harsher 
than the remedy chosen by the court—continued oversight by the court and 
mandatory updates by the FCC.148  This example shows that there can be 
little to no difference between an agency’s response to a decision finding it 
unlawfully delayed and a decision finding it acted within its authority.   
In 1991, the D.C. Circuit applied the TRAC factors in In re Barr 
Laboratories, Inc.149 when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) failed 
to review a new drug application within a statutory deadline.150  The court 
held that mandamus was not appropriate because compelling the agency to 
act would “impose offsetting burdens on equally worthy generic drug 
producers, equally wronged by the agency’s delay.”151  The court, utilizing 
TRAC’s fourth factor, held that unreasonable delay alone does not justify 
judicial intervention, and that requiring the FDA to act on the plaintiff’s 
application ahead of others would simply compromise the agency’s other 
                                                                                                                          
146 Id. at 80 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 81. 
149 930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
150 Id. at 74. 
151 Id. at 73. 
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priorities.152  Any benefit derived from expediting one application would 
delay other equally worthy applications, and the court determined it had no 
remedy available that would “advance either fairness or Congress’s policy 
objective.”153  Had the court ordered the FDA to act immediately on the 
plaintiff’s application, it would have been doing no more than prioritizing 
the agency’s resources—and if every applicant with a legitimate claim 
against the FDA’s failure to meet its statutory deadline had filed suit, the 
court would have no remedy to provide. 
In Forest Guardians v. Babbitt (Forest Guardians II),154 however, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit declined to follow In 
re Barr Laboratories and did not apply the TRAC factors when the 
Department of the Interior missed a clear statutory deadline.155  The APA 
stated that a “reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.”156  The Tenth Circuit understood 
“unreasonably delayed” to mean that a court generally has discretion to 
determine when agency delay is unreasonable.157  Ultimately, however, the 
court held that when an agency fails to meet a congressionally imposed 
deadline, a court-ordered writ of mandamus is always appropriate and 
necessary because agency action was “unlawfully withheld” under the 
APA.158  Thus, in Forest Guardians, the Tenth Circuit held that mandamus 
was appropriate to compel the Secretary of the Interior to designate the 
critical habitat boundaries of the silvery minnow when the Secretary had 
exceeded the allotted time.159  Both In re Barr Laboratories and Forest 
Guardians were decided over ten years ago, and the Supreme Court has 
not addressed the split between the D.C. and Tenth Circuit. 
While the Tenth Circuit has adopted a black-line rule for determining 
when mandamus is necessary, the application of the rule in Forest 
Guardians led the parties to a result similar to the more lenient rule 
adopted by the D.C. Circuit in In re Barr Laboratories.  After remanding 
the case and directing the lower court to “consider what work is necessary 
to complete the [habitat] designation,”160 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged 
its powers were insufficient.161  Although the deadline had passed two 
                                                                                                                          
152 Id. at 75. 
153 Id. at 76. 
154 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999). 
155 Id. at 1191. 
156 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994). 
157 Forest Guardians II, 174 F.3d at 1190. 
158 Id. at 1191.  
159 Id. at 1193. 
160 Forest Guardians v. Babbitt (Forest Guardians I), 164 F.3d 1261, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998), 
amended by 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999). 
161 See Forest Guardians II, 174 F.3d at 1180 (amending its original decision and holding that 
“any order now to impose a new deadline for compliance must consider what work is necessary to 
publish the final rule and how quickly that can be accomplished”). 
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years prior, and mandamus was ruled appropriate, the court was at a loss 
for what it could realistically expect to demand from the agency.  When 
agency inaction is the result of inadequate resources, courts acknowledge 
that they lack the expertise to balance the competing demands of the 
agency,162 and risk reorganizing the agency’s priorities to the detriment of 
another party.163 
C.  Agency Inaction in the Face of Limited Resources 
Agency delay may be caused by various impediments such as 
congressional politics, presidential priorities, agency capture, 
incompetency, unforeseen circumstances, or simply limited resources.  It is 
this last cause of delay that the NRC argued prevents it from reviewing the 
DOE application.164  The NRC contended that TRAC cannot be applied to 
determine whether mandamus is appropriate because the agency cannot be 
faulted for inaction for something that is “impossible” to accomplish given 
the absence of congressional appropriations.165  It argued that the three-
year statutory deadline to make a determination on the DOE application for 
a permanent repository was “tolled” by Congress, which chose not to 
appropriate adequate resources to complete the review.166 
Further, the NRC argued it cannot conduct an adequate review without 
the DOE actively litigating and defending its application before the 
ASLB.167  As the applicant, the DOE must defend the more than 288 
outstanding contentions by interveners, and Congress has refused to 
appropriate funding to the DOE for such purposes just as it has withheld 
funding from the NRC.168 
With more than $28 billion sitting in the Waste Fund, one might think 
the NRC does not have a shortage of resources.  If a writ of mandamus is 
an equitable solution, then perhaps a court should order the NRC to use the 
Waste Fund or use general appropriations.  Unfortunately for the 
petitioners, these solutions run afoul of the Constitution and the NWPA. 
The NWPA states the repository should not be built with taxpayer 
dollars, but with fees levied on the entities whose nuclear waste will be 
                                                                                                                          
162 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency decision not to enforce 
often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its 
expertise.”). 
163 See, e.g., Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(describing TRAC’s fifth factor). 
164 Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 39. 
165 Id. at 56–57. 
166 Id. at 57.  As used in this Note, to toll something means “to stop the running of [it],” and is 
used to reference the suspension of a statute’s time requirements.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1625 
(9th ed. 2009). 
167 Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 27.   
168 See supra text accompanying notes 84–89. 
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stored.169  The Waste Fund, established by section 302(c) of the NWPA, is 
paid into by producers of nuclear waste and may only be used to dispose 
nuclear waste, or matters associated with a permanent solution.170  To date, 
the NRC has used the Waste Fund only when Congress has appropriated 
funds from it.  Restricting itself from using general funds is consistent with 
appropriations law established by Congress and clarified by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the Principles of Federal 
Appropriations.171  This highly respected guidance states that an agency 
may not use a general appropriation where Congress has made a specific 
appropriation for a program, unless the specific appropriation has been 
exhausted and the legislation stipulates that the general appropriation may 
be used at such time.172  Article I of the Constitution entrusts Congress to 
appropriate money from the Treasury,173 which administers the Waste 
Fund.174  Simply put, the judicial authority to issue a writ of mandamus is 
not extensive enough to order the NRC, Treasury, or Congress to use the 
Waste Fund for the sole purpose for which it was created.175 
Even if the NRC could use general appropriations, it is not possible to 
know what ramifications it would have on the NRC’s other priorities.  
Courts have been reluctant to decide how an agency should spend its 
resources on a given mandate.176  Using general appropriations to review 
the DOE application would sacrifice other statutory priorities of the NRC, 
                                                                                                                          
169 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(7) (2006). 
170 Id. § 10222(c), (d); see also 128 CONG. REC. 32,554, 32,556–67 (1982) (floor comments by 
Senator James McClure, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources); 128 
CONG. REC. 26,306, 26,308 (1982) (summary of the Act entered into the record by Congressman 
Morris Udall, Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs). 
171 See 1 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-2615P, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-21 to 2-23 (3d ed. 2004) (“The Red Book”).  Congress has tasked the GAO 
with guiding federal agencies on matters of appropriations law.  See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3528–3529 
(authorizing the GAO to relieve from liability a government official authorized to spend money of the 
United States if the official wrongfully spent funds but did so in good faith, and instructing the GAO to 
respond to certified officials when they pose questions regarding how the agency’s funds may be 
spent).  To fulfill this responsibility the GAO publishes the Red Book, a comprehensive three-volume 
guide on appropriations law that federal agencies consult on a daily basis when they have questions 
regarding how much appropriations money they can spend and for what purposes.  If an agency seeks 
more assurance, it may petition the GAO for a decision on the matter.  Id. § 3529.  The Red Book and 
GAO decisions provide guidance and a healthy precedent for most inquiries, but they do not provide 
guidance for all possible scenarios, e.g., whether the remaining $11.1 million at the NRC’s disposal 
must be spent down. 
172 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 171, at 2-21. 
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
174 42 U.S.C. § 10222(c).  
175 For other examples when courts are limited in their ability to force the hand of government, 
see supra, notes 105 and accompanying text. 
176 In using TRAC factors, the court avoided making decisions for agencies that were better 
positioned to prioritize their responsibilities with available resources.  See Telecomms. Research & 
Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (outlining the fourth factor). 
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and would not remedy the DOE’s inability to be an active participant. 
Some courts and scholars have taken the position that a statutory 
deadline represents the clear intent of Congress, and that section 706(1) of 
the APA demands that courts compel agencies to comply regardless of 
resource constraints.  The Tenth Circuit took this position in Forest 
Guardians, as discussed above.177  Professor Eric Biber highlights resource 
allocation as a consistent and principal factor in opinions by courts 
reviewing agency decisions.178  Biber believes an agency without adequate 
resources should be permitted to delay a statutory mandate indefinitely if 
resources are not provided—but he makes a similar exception as the Tenth 
Circuit, and would compel an agency to act if it is in violation of a 
statutory deadline.179  He joins the general consensus that courts must 
compel agencies with statutory deadlines to act regardless of inadequate 
resources.180 
Despite the reasoned arguments that courts must compel agencies to 
act when they miss their statutory deadlines, should the deadline stand 
without question when Congress has intentionally underfunded the 
program?  Is there no basis in law that a deadline set by Congress is not 
absolute in the face of inadequate funding?  When courts are tasked with 
reconciling conflicting legislation, such as the NWPA against recent 
appropriations bills, they question Congress’s rationale.  However, the 
precarious situation of underfunding a repository in Nevada does not stem 
from a single, rational, comprehensive plan.  It is the product of competing 
interests within Congresses from the past and present.  There are 
competing goals scattered amongst the 535 elected representatives, and 
courts have the task of deciphering what Congress as an institution 
intended.181  It becomes trickier when the competing goals of individual 
members result in legislation that is non-representative of any one member 
but the married outcome of many. 
The remainder of Part III.C will review federal cases that address 
whether an agency must follow the strict reading of a statute when 
underfunding, impossibility, absurd results, and congressional intent does 
not favor a strict application of the law.  In 1931, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that “[a] literal application of a statute which would lead to 
absurd consequences is to be avoided whenever a reasonable application 
                                                                                                                          
177 Forest Guardians II, 174 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 1999). 
178 Biber, supra note 123, at 26–27. 
179 Id. at 49. 
180 But see In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that delay beyond a 
statutory mandate is not unreasonable where compelling an agency to process a plaintiff’s application 
would be detrimental to others with applications pending before the agency).   
181 For a discussion on the difficulty posed when determining the intent of a Congress, see 
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 
864–65 (1992) (defending use of legislative intent by the courts). 
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can be given which is consistent with the legislative purpose.”182  The 
Court held that although a provision in the National Prohibition Act 
permitted the government to seize all items found in a building used to 
manufacture intoxicating liquor, the government could only seize those 
items used or belonging to the defendant charged with violating the Act.183  
To permit the government to seize items belonging to third parties would 
create the “absurd consequence[]” of a “penalt[y] having no relation to the 
offense.”184 
There are times when a court should permit an agency to ignore a strict 
adherence of the law resulting in an absurd result due to a lack of agency 
resources.  The D.C. Circuit applied this rationale in Open America when it 
held that an agency without adequate resources has discretion to miss a 
statutory deadline if the agency is making a good faith effort to comply.185 
In some circumstances, it is clear that an “absurd” result created by a 
statute must be followed.  In a decision limiting the power of courts to 
dismiss a statute, the Supreme Court held in Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) v. Hill186 that the government could not close the gates on a 
completed $100 million dam because it would destroy the habitat of an 
endangered minnow.187  Destruction of the habitat was prohibited under the 
Endangered Species Act,188 which preceded appropriations to build the 
dam.  The trial court held that the government could close the dam, noting 
Congress was fully aware of the habitat’s imminent destruction when it 
appropriated the funds, and that “[a]t some point in time a federal project 
becomes so near completion and so incapable of modification that a court 
of equity should not apply a statute enacted long after inception of the 
project to produce an unreasonable result.”189   
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and upheld the “cardinal 
rule” that authorizing legislation can only be repealed by subsequent 
legislation that directly repeals the prior law, and this is only more true for 
an implied repeal found in an appropriation bill.190  Further, the Court 
avoided making any judgment on the reasonableness of the Act that forced 
                                                                                                                          
182 United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931) (emphasis added). 
183 Id. at 175–76.  
184 Id. at 175. 
185 Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(vacating an order that would have required the FBI to respond to a FOIA request within thirty days 
when the agency had no new resources to manage a case load demanding $2.7 million in resources and 
the agency was making a good faith effort to respond in the most fair, practical manner). 
186 437 U.S. 153 (1978), superseded by statute, Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 5, 92 Stat. 3751, 3761.  For a discussion on the part of the decision that remains 
good law, and on which this Note relies, see infra note 191.  
187 437 U.S. at 174. 
188 16 U.S.C. §§1531–1543 (1976) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)).  
189 Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
190 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 189. 
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abandonment of $100 million spent on a dam, since the underlying law 
was “abundantly clear that the balance ha[d] been struck in favor of 
affording endangered species the highest of priorities.”191 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also heard 
a case about a partially completed dam in County of Vernon v. United 
States.192  The court held that the Army Corps of Engineers did not violate 
the statute when it stopped construction of a dam with funds remaining 
because Congress had gone fourteen years without appropriating the 
requisite funds to complete the job.193  The Army Corps had acquired 
several thousand acres and undertaken construction from 1971 to 1975, at 
which time the Governor and the state’s congressional representatives had 
withdrawn their support.194  Congress ceased all funding by 1977 and the 
court was not asked to rule until 1991.195   
The facts are analogous to In re Aiken County, although the Seventh 
Circuit could say with more certainty that after fourteen years of no 
appropriations for the dam, Washington would continue to not provide 
additional funds.  It is easy to agree that a writ of mandamus ordering the 
Army Corps to spend down all of its remaining funds would have been 
absurd.  It is somewhat harder to argue that the writ of mandamus ordering 
the NRC to do the same is absurd given that the Yucca project is only on 
its third year of zero funding, nuclear waste is a problem that will not go 
away, and proponents of Yucca remain in Congress. 
Not only does Congress appropriate inadequate funds, but at times it 
proactively prohibits the use of any funds for a statutory mandate.  Just 
months after the Secretary of Interior exceeded the Endangered Species 
Act deadline for declaring the habitat boundaries of the red-legged frog, 
Congress precluded expenditure of FY 1995 funds for such activities.196  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 
Environmental Defense Center v. Babbitt197 that if an appropriation bill 
                                                                                                                          
191 Id. at 194.  In direct response to the Court’s decision, Congress passed section 5 of the 
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, which inserted an exemption into the Act allowing the 
Tellico Dam to close and flood the endangered minnow’s habitat.  So while TVA v. Hill was technically 
superseded, it is still cited as good law for its principles: requiring courts to uphold troublesome aspects 
of legislation when the intent of Congress was clear, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) 
(“Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial 
process comes to an end.  We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of 
veto.” (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194–95)), and that an authorizing statute cannot be modified or 
amended by an appropriations statute, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 
644, 670 (2007) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 189 n.35). 
192 933 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991).  
193 Id. at 535. 
194 Id. at 533. 
195 Id.  
196 Envt’l Def. Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 869–70 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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prohibits use of the funds from carrying out a particular mandate, then a 
writ of mandamus is not appropriate because it is impossible for the agency 
to comply with the statute.198  The Ninth Circuit dictated that the statutory 
mandate was not repealed, but there was no duty to act until funds were 
made available.199 
IV.  ADOPTING A NEW RULE 
A.  Challenge for the Courts 
After waiting a year to see if Congress would address the inconsistency 
between what the law mandated and the reality of appropriated funds, the 
D.C. Circuit ordered the NRC to spend the remaining $11.1 million to 
review the DOE application for Yucca.200  Essentially, the court held that 
after a reasonable amount of patience, it is always appropriate to order an 
agency to use remaining funds to move forward with a statutory 
mandate.201  Although the court acknowledged that the $11.1 million 
would be wasted if Congress did not take action to fund the review 
process, the court reasoned that it had “no good choice but to grant the 
petition for a writ of mandamus.”202  But there was a better choice. 
The court’s main argument was that continual defiance of a statutory 
mandate violated Congress’s constitutional authority to pass laws that the 
Executive must obey.203  The court simplified the facts to fit them within 
the constitutional principle requiring the Executive to “follow statutory 
mandates so long as there is appropriated money available.”204  It is not a 
fair analysis of the facts to assert that appropriated money is available to 
review the license for a repository at Yucca Mountain when spending it 
would not increase the speed or likelihood of achieving the policy 
objectives of the NWPA.  While an agency cannot ignore a mandate 
simply because Congress provided inadequate funding,205 the court should 
permit the mandate to be tolled until funds are appropriated.206    
But what is adequate funding, and should the agency make that 
determination?  The court in In re Aiken County only addressed the latter 
                                                                                                                          
198 Id. at 869. 
199 Id. 
200 In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 266. 
203 Id. at 259. 
204 Id. 
205  See id. at 259 (holding that three consecutive years of near zero appropriations for a statutory 
mandate does not repeal the mandate). 
206 See id. at 268 (Garland, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that the NRC has not refused to proceed 
with the mandate receiving zero appropriations for three consecutive years, only that the agency has 
suspended the process until there are sufficient funds to make meaningful progress). 
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question and rejected more discretion at the helm of agencies, under the 
concern it would shift power from Congress to the Executive.207  Further, if 
mandates can be tolled due to inadequate appropriations, how can courts be 
assured that an agency is not abusing that discretion to toll laws it 
disfavors? 
B.  The Proposed Rule 
This Note proposes that a writ of mandamus ordering an agency to act 
is not appropriate when there is near certainty the action will not expedite 
relief for the claimant due to a lack of future appropriations.  As was the 
court’s conclusion in TRAC, the decision whether to allow an agency to 
violate a statute is not an easy one.208  But drawing on the discussion in 
Part III, courts would be wise to consider the following factors: 
(1) whether general appropriated funds may be used to fulfill 
the statutory duty; 
(2) whether Congress is unlikely to appropriate sufficient 
funds in the future that would render spending the remaining 
funds beneficial to fulfilling the statutory mandate; 
(3) whether starting and stopping actions to address the 
statutory mandate creates added costs; and 
(4) whether mandamus would negatively implicate the 
agency’s other statutory duties.  
Each of these factors should be applied with the flexibility necessary to 
successfully exercise the equitable authority of courts.209  
Factor 1:  Whether general appropriated funds may be used to 
fulfill the statutory duty.   
If general appropriated funds may be used to fulfill a duty by a 
statutory mandate, then an agency should be ordered to draw on such funds 
in a manner that does not have negative implications—such as those 
discussed below in Factor 4.  If an agency has full discretion to use its 
general appropriations to fulfill the mandate then courts must appropriately 
balance this ability with the other factors.  The agencies in In re Barr 
Laboratories, Environmental Defense Center, and Forest Guardians all 
had limitations on some set of funding.  In a comparable manner, the NRC 
                                                                                                                          
207 Id. at 259 (majority opinion). 
208 See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Although 
the standard is hardly ironclad, and sometimes suffers from vagueness, it nevertheless provides useful 
guidance in assessing claims of agency delay.”). 
209 See, e.g., Miaskoff, supra note 103, at 652 (“The TRAC test is necessarily flexible because the 
issue of reasonableness is a question of fact.”). 
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was prohibited from using its general appropriations. 
Factor 2:  Whether Congress is unlikely to appropriate sufficient 
funds in the future that would render spending the remaining funds 
beneficial to fulfilling the statutory mandate.   
Politics is unpredictable and given the sheer difficulty of passing 
legislation that a majority of Congress supports, courts should not rely on 
what Congress might do next.  But at times, it is appropriate to predict 
what Congress will not do.  The Seventh Circuit correctly held that after 
fourteen years of no additional funding, the Army Corps of Engineers 
cannot be ordered to continue construction of a dam when “Congress has 
not appropriated sufficient funds to complete the Project.”210  The proposed 
rule states that if there is near certainty that Congress will not appropriate 
additional funds for a mandated project that a court should weigh such 
facts in its decision whether to compel agency action.   
The possibility of future funding is necessary for the writ of mandamus 
to have any chance at providing relief to the claimant.  The petitioners in In 
re Aiken County ultimately sought not just NRC’s review of the Yucca 
application, or a repository in Nevada, but also the carting away of nuclear 
waste from their respective locales.  Absent the possibility of future 
funding, a writ of mandamus ordering the NRC to act will not expedite the 
remedy sought by the petitioners, and it would not be within the court’s 
jurisdiction to issue such a writ. 
Therefore, can the D.C. Circuit be near certain that Congress will not 
appropriate adequate funding for the review of the DOE application after 
making zero appropriations in the three previous years?  This Note does 
not imagine that predicting Congress’s inaction in the future will be easy.  
Reliance on three years of congressional action to make a prediction is 
materially different than reliance on fourteen years of no funding, as 
considered by the Seventh Circuit in County of Vernon.  However, it would 
be foolish to think that the NRC will receive the necessary funding to make 
measurable progress within the next four years when considering the 
following relevant factors: the nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi 
motivated a new sense of congressional urgency to address nuclear 
waste;211 the most recent Presidential budgets have all requested zero or 
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resulted in exposure of spent fuel rods and a significant release of radioactive material.  Mitsuru Obe & 
George Nishiyama, Japan Works to Avoid New Blast: Nuclear-Plant Operators Begin Injecting 
Nitrogen into Reactor, as U.S. Assessment Flags Range of Risks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2011, at A10.  
The accident sparked a wave of calls to move more SNF from the cooling pools to dry casks at a faster 
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inadequate funding for the Yucca licensing process; the Majority Leader in 
the Senate has blocked all attempts to provide even marginal funding for 
the licensing process; and the expectation that Obama and Reid will 
maintain the same policy prerogative during their time in office through 
January 2017.   
There is near certainty that Congress will not act before the NRC uses 
the entire $11.1 million before making any permanent progress on the 
review.  Even if Senate Republicans win a majority in the 2014 election 
and pass an appropriation bill that fully funds the licensing process and 
there is a legislative vehicle that avoids a presidential veto, funding for the 
application review would arrive at the NRC in the last months of 2015.212  
Even under these most promising conditions for Yucca supporters, the 
review process of Yucca Mountain will not receive another dollar for more 
than two years. 
Factor 3:  Whether starting and stopping actions to address the 
statutory mandate creates added costs.   
Mandamus is an equitable remedy that considers “timing, resources, 
and efficacy.”213  It cannot be assumed that spending money today will 
move a process closer to completion, especially a federal agency that must 
put projects on pause as it waits for additional funds.  The Supreme Court 
in Chaney recognized greater agency discretion because, inter alia, 
agencies are the experts in the field and judges are inferior at balancing 
competing priorities with limited resources.214  If a court finds an agency is 
likely to spend all of a program’s funding before Congress appropriates 
additional funds, then the court must ask whether ordering the agency to 
act will result in a squandering of those funds.  The substantive law might 
be better addressed, and in quicker fashion, if those limited resources are 
combined with future appropriations by Congress.  The NRC argued that 
starting and stopping a review process sacrifices the ability to retain 
specialists, assemble the ASLB judges to hear contentions, furnish a 
courtroom facility in Nevada, and pick up the litigation on contentions left 
unresolved.215  An equitable solution with these circumstances does not 
demand a writ of mandamus. 
                                                                                                                          
speed.  Matthew L. Wald, A Safer Nuclear Crypt, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at B1.  At a minimum, 
policy leaders are favoring relocating spent fuel to consolidation storage to minimize the dangers of 
natural disasters.  See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 16. 
212 The newly elected Congress will begin January 3, 2015, U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1, and be 
responsible for the coming FY 2016 appropriations, beginning October 1, 2015, 2 U.S.C. § 631 (2012). 
213 In re Aiken Cnty., No. 11-1271, 2012 WL 3140360, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
214 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985). 
215 Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 44. 
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Factor 4:  Whether mandamus would negatively implicate the 
agency’s other statutory duties. 
Courts should not order agency action that grants relief for a party 
before the court at the expense of other individuals with adjudicatory 
matters before the agency.  As was addressed in In re Barr Laboratories, 
the D.C. Circuit held that a writ of mandamus ordering an agency to 
review a claimant’s application was not appropriate when doing so would 
delay the applications of other parties filed with the FDA.216  Congress set 
a time limit on the review of generic drug applications, and had the court 
ordered the agency to act on the plaintiff’s application, the order would 
have frustrated the statute by further delaying other applications also 
entitled to protection by the statute’s deadlines.217  In Open America, the 
D.C. Circuit was correct not to interfere with the FBI’s management of its 
FOIA response protocol even though it had a backlog of 5,000 requests 
exceeding the statutory deadline.218  Factor 4 was not relevant to In re 
Aiken County, where the NWPA required all appropriations from the 
Waste Fund to be used for a nuclear repository and Yucca Mountain is the 
only possible site. 
One factor omitted from the proposed rule, but included in TRAC, is 
whether missing a statutory deadline or agency delay is found to mask 
impropriety by an agency.219  Such improper actions were not lost on Judge 
Rudolph, who joined the opinion in In re Aiken County.220  If impropriety 
were a factor, then surely the Administration’s and former Chairman 
Jaczko’s actions do not favor more discretion for the Executive to 
determine when inadequate funding permits tolling of a statutory mandate.  
But the proposed rule is indifferent to whether the agency delayed 
unfaithfully, focusing instead on preventing waste and avoiding absurd 
results. 
Even if former Chairman Jaczko had illegally undermined the NRC’s 
ability to review the Yucca application, once Congress cut appropriations, 
the Chairman’s policy agenda became representative of current 
appropriations law.  It is not a coincidence that opposition to Yucca at the 
oversight agency occurred around the same time Congress undermined the 
agency.  When Congress is expected to defund an authorized project, even 
an impartial head of an agency would have practical reasons to prepare for 
the budget cuts if doing so preserves the integrity of the project.  Although 
                                                                                                                          
216 In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991).   
217 Id.  
218 Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
219 See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (outlining 
the sixth TRAC factor: “the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in 
order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
220 In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 267–68 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Randolph, J., concurring). 
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Chairman Jaczko did everything to shut down the license review process 
before Congress took legislative action, a Chairman favoring the review 
process would take the same action if Congress was underfunding the 
program.  For these reasons, it is appropriate for the proposed rule to be 
indifferent to impropriety when congressional appropriations preclude 
progress towards the statutory mandate. 
The proposed rule also does not account for the possibility that partial 
review of the DOE application would provide relief to the claimant seeking 
a writ of mandamus.  Although this question was not before the court, it is 
worthy to explain why not—given that the plaintiffs argued that partial 
completion of the review process has utility.221  Along with members of 
Congress, they argue that the NRC should respond to the court decision by 
moving forward immediately with the Safety Evaluation Report (SER),222 a 
NRC report that makes technical conclusions regarding whether the DOE 
application is compliant with safety and security regulations.223    
Their argument can feature one of two propositions.  First, that 
completion of the SER will prove Yucca meets all safety regulations—
undermining the argument of opponents and reigniting the political support 
necessary to fund the project.224  This argument has no merit because 
courts do not issue a writ of mandamus that provides relief in the form of 
political victories that may or may not result in benefits outside the control 
of the court.225 
                                                                                                                          
221 See, e.g., Petitioners’ Response to Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, In re Aiken 
Cnty., 725 F.3d 255 (No. 11-1271) (“The SERs and the full licensing record, paid for by billions of 
dollars of public funds, will inform all future repository efforts, regardless of whether Yucca Mountain 
is ever built.”). 
222 See Press Release, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong., In Wake of Court’s 
Order, NRC and DOE Testify on Yucca Mountain License Review (Sept. 10, 2013), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/wake-court%E2%80%99s-order-nrc-and-doe-testify-
yucca-mountain-license-review (pressuring the NRC to complete its SER of the DOE application, even 
if the full review is not currently possible). 
223 Implementing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act—Next Steps: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Env’t and the Econ. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of 
Allison M. MacFarlane, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n).  The SER was planned to be 
reported in five volumes, and volume one was released in 2010 before the review process was put on 
hold.  Id.; see also 1 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT RELATED TO DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL 
RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA, U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N 1 (2009) (noting that the NRC documents the review process of a license 
application in a SER). 
224 See Petitioners’ Response to Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 221, at 9 
(recognizing that the SERs “will inform all future repository efforts”).  
225 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 (1992) (holding that the complaint, 
requesting that an Egyptian construction project receiving U.S. funds comply with the Endangered 
Species Act, lacked redressability because the construction project could still be implemented, and the 
habitat of an endangered species destroyed, when U.S. aid only accounted for 10% of the project’s 
funding); Weber v. United States, 209 F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a writ of mandamus 
is not appropriate to order an agency investigation that leads to a recommendation not binding on 
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Second, proponents of Yucca may argue that the review process is a 
step-by-step process, and every step completed reduces the amount of time 
remaining to complete the entire review.  However, it has not been shown 
that $11.1 million is enough to complete the SER, and the premise that it 
can be completed contradicts the finding by the court that no meaningful 
progress could be conducted with just $11.1 million.226  Even if the SER 
can be completed with the funds, it was never shown that doing so would 
expedite the additional pieces of the NRC review necessary to approve the 
application.227 
C.  What Should Be Made of Congressional Intent? 
The Supreme Court has long held that courts need not apply a strict 
reading of the law if such a reading yields an absurd result.228  At the same 
time, the Court’s decision in TVA v. Hill holds that courts should not apply 
the absurdity doctrine where Congress was aware of the law’s impact.229  
So, if spending $11.1 million would prove completely wasteful, is it 
possible Congress was not aware of the impact the NWPA and subsequent 
appropriations would have on the overall plan?  Through public pledges, 
committee reports, and letters to agency officials, congressional leaders 
have staked out their positions on Yucca; however, the recent 
appropriation bills and corresponding conference reports offer no 
explanation of what Congress intended when it provided zero funding for 
FYs 2012 and 2013 for the NRC’s review of the application.230  The latest 
appropriation bills reflect congressional intent to prevent any meaningful 
review of the DOE application during the most recent fiscal years231—but 
does it show that Congress was aware that $11.1 million of taxpayer 
dollars would be squandered on a review process that is impossible to 
                                                                                                                          
anyone); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984) (denying standing to plaintiff arguing that 
a tax exemption unconstitutionally creates as segregated school system because, inter alia, it was 
speculative whether the tax exemption caused the segregated schools). 
226 See In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 267 (“[I]f Congress determines in the wake of our decision 
that it will never fund the Commission’s licensing process to completion, we would certainly hope that 
Congress would step in before the current $11.1 million is expended, so as to avoid wasting that 
taxpayer money.” (emphasis added)); id. at 269–70 (Garland, C.J., dissenting) (“The Commission has 
concluded that it cannot [make any meaningful progress with the remaining $11.1 million].  And we 
are not in a position—nor do we have any basis—to second-guess that conclusion.” (citations 
omitted)). 
227 Most notably, the review process includes a lengthy litigation before the ASLB, where 
interested parties may challenge the DOE application.  See Fact Sheet on Licensing Yucca Mountain, 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-
yucca-license-review.html (last updated March 29, 2012).   
228 See supra note 182.   
229 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
230 H.R. REP. NO. 112-331, at 855 (2011) (Conf. Rep.).   
231 See supra Part II.E. 
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finish? 
It is possible that Congress expected some waste and inefficiency in 
the review process when it zeroed out appropriations for Yucca.  But that 
action does not show intent; it shows a preference to waste an unknown 
amount in favor of delaying Yucca.  More importantly, a look at any 
authorizing legislation, in this case the NWPA, would never show intent to 
waste $11.1 million.  By ordering the spending of $11.1 million, the D.C. 
Circuit avoided an opportunity to apply the absurdity doctrine. 
While there is no clear congressional intent that the NRC should spend 
down the $11.1 million, it is also true that there is no clear intent that the 
NRC should hold the funds and delay its review of the application.  The 
government erroneously argued that “Congress’s most recent funding 
decisions demonstrate a legislative intent . . . that NRC should not conduct 
its proceeding to review the application [at this time].”232  This reads too 
much into congressional inaction and wrongfully suggests that if the NRC 
moved forward with reviewing the Yucca application it would be in 
violation of the appropriation bills when the agency is fully authorized to 
move forward.  TVA v. Hill still supports the cardinal rule that repealing an 
authorizing legislation by mere implication is not favored, especially when 
the implication is in an appropriations bill.233  There could be no judicial 
review of a decision by the NRC to spend the $11.1 million, even if it was 
found to be completely wasteful.234 
 On the other hand, a writ of mandamus ordering an agency to spend 
down funds that produce no measurable benefit to the public can be 
considered an absurd result that Congress never intended.  Had the D.C. 
Circuit held mandamus was not appropriate, the decision would have been 
consistent with the absurdity doctrine and the holding in TVA v. Hill. 
D.  Responding to the D.C. Circuit 
In its decision, the D.C. Circuit was concerned with a shift in 
constitutional authority that would occur if agencies were given discretion 
to toll statutory mandates due to inadequate resources.235  By ordering the 
NRC to continue its review of the application for Yucca Mountain, the 
court believed it was protecting Congress’s constitutional authority.  It is 
ironic that the leading cause of the shift was Congress itself.  When the 
                                                                                                                          
232 Final Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 38. 
233 See 437 U.S. at 174 (holding it is unlawful to close the gates on a $100 million completed dam 
and flood the river basin of an endangered minnow). 
234 See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (holding that spending dollars from a lump sum 
appropriation on an authorized program is not a reviewable action by the courts because it is an act 
“committed to agency discretion by law” (quoting the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 701(a)(2) (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
235 In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 266–67 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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Waste Fund has over $28 billion that can be used solely for a repository at 
Yucca Mountain and Congress appropriates zero dollars, it is clear that 
Congress’s intent was to block the completion of the repository.  Refusing 
to order the NRC to act would have provided relatively no disruption to the 
NWPA as compared with the intentional defunding of the NWPA by the 
same legislative body whose authority the D.C. Circuit asserts to be 
protecting. 
The D.C. Circuit also emphasized that an appropriation cannot amend 
an authorization act, and it rightfully cited TVA v. Hill for that 
proposition.236  But In re Aiken County can be distinguished from TVA v. 
Hill for two reasons.  First, in TVA v. Hill, the Act upheld by the court was 
not dependent on the appropriation in conflict with it.237  In In re Aiken 
County, the NWPA was threatened by a lack of appropriations and unlike 
TVA v. Hill, the D.C. Circuit was not forced to pick one over the other.  
Rather, the challenge to the D.C. Circuit was how to salvage the NWPA 
despite the lack of appropriations.  Its decision did nothing to further the 
policy objectives of the NWPA because the $11.1 million is near certain to 
be squandered due to a lack of future appropriations.  Second, 
congressional intent is not as clear.  The NWPA addresses what is 
expected of the NRC when it has inadequate funds, as compared with the 
Endangered Species Act, which is understood to protect the habitats of 
endangered species at all costs. 
E.  Benefits of the Proposed Rule 
In addition to providing a more equitable remedy for agencies caught 
between statutory deadlines and inadequate appropriations, the proposed 
rule will have societal benefits.  Unfunded and underfunded authorizations 
create inefficiencies that waste taxpayers’ dollars.238  The Congresses that 
underfund projects in the name of fiscal responsibility ironically create 
these situations.  When an agency misses a deadline, it is accused of 
inefficiency and incompetency by critics and elected officials, when in 
truth Congress deserves to share in the blame for giving the agency a 
mandate that is impossible to complete without available funds. 
Instead of forcing agencies to rush projects and underperform, a court 
decision confirming the impossibility of a statutory mandate will 
appropriately cast responsibility back on Congress.239  A member of 
                                                                                                                          
236 Id. at 261 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 189). 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 186–91.  
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Congress wishing to implement a new education program, fix bridges, 
establish historic landmarks, or any other project within their constituents’ 
list of priorities has an easier path to get the program authorized than they 
do to get it funded.240  For one, elected officials are inclined to vote for 
their colleagues’ projects that do not impact the budget.  Second, the public 
often fails to appreciate that an authorization is an empty gesture until it 
receives funding.  It is insincere for politicians to highlight the passage of 
new initiatives, and then fail to secure the necessary funding to see the 
projects through.  Elected officials need to be held accountable for 
supporting authorization bills, and campaigning on the passage of new 
policy, but then failing to provide adequate funding. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The appropriations process is undermining the ability of federal 
agencies to meet the mandates set by Congress.  This can be especially true 
of projects spanning multiple years or those with statutory deadlines.  A 
writ of mandamus is not appropriate if it would force an agency to spend 
taxpayer dollars in a manner that would not increase the likelihood of 
fulfilling the statute’s policy objective.  Past court decisions confirm that 
mandamus is not necessary in every case where a statutory mandate has 
been violated or ignored by an agency.  A review of circuit court decisions 
shows that agencies should be given discretion to toll a statutory mandate 
when they have inadequate resources. 
There is a near certainty that the NRC’s review of the Yucca licensing 
application will not be funded in the near future.  It is also questionable 
whether in the long-term Congress will fund, and the NRC will approve, a 
repository at Yucca Mountain.  Spending $11.1 million to review the 
Yucca application will prove to be a useless, unintended consequence of 
legislation that provides no relief for the claimants in In re Aiken County.  
Future courts should recognize that neither the Constitution nor any 
jurisprudence on judicial review of an agency action requires a similar 
decision. 
                                                                                                                          
the authorizing statute, in order to hold elected officials responsible for intentionally authorizing 
programs that they will not fund). 
240 See Biber, supra note 123, at 46 (arguing that elected officials score easy political points by 
passing authorizing legislation that addresses an issue, but that little attention is given to whether 
Congress follows up with an adequate appropriation).  
